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DENIAL OF TITLE VII PROTECTION TO
TRANSSEXUALS:
ULANE V. EASTERN AIRLINES, INC.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an employer may
not discriminate against an individual on the basis of that individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' Although the statute was passed
primarily to outlaw racial discrimination, 2 the word "sex" was proposed as
an addition to the statute by a southern congressman who wished to defeat
passage of the entire statute.3 Congress, however, approved Title VII without
significant debate over the meaning of the word sex. 4
Despite the absence of legislative guidance as to the precise meaning of
the word sex, 5 courts have held that Congress intended the word's inclusion
to guarantee women freedom from discriminatory employment practices. 6
Nevertheless, plaintiffs have repeatedly tried to persuade courts to extend
Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination to situations perhaps not envi-
sioned by Congress in 1964. Courts have responded to the challenge of
determining the parameters of discrimination based on sex by interpreting
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The statute specifically
prohibits discrimination that concerns hiring, firing, compensation, terms, conditions, or priv-
ileges of employment. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(I). The statute applies to employers engaged in an
industry affecting commerce that employs fifteen or more persons for twenty or more weeks
of the calendar year. Id. § 2000e(b). For a detailed description of Title VII and other federal
statutes prohibiting employment discrimination, see C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RIcARDs,
FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1980).
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (Title VII was passed primarily
"to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.").
3. The amendment was offered by Congressman Howard Smith of Virginia. 110 CoNo.
REc. 2577 (1964). Congresswoman Green questioned Congressman Smith's motives during
debate on the proposed amendment, which she said would "clutter up [Title VII] and it may
later-very well-be used to help destroy this section of the bill by some of the very people
who today support it." Id. at 2581; see also Note, Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1167
(1971).
4. See Wentzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975); Diaz v. Pan
Am. Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). For the
complete debate regarding the proposed amendment to Title VII of the word "sex," see 110
CoNG. REc. 2577-84 (1964).
5. Specifically, the amendment was intended to protect white women. See I10 CoNO. REc.
2580 (1964), where Congresswoman Griffiths stated that "a vote against this amendment today
by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter, or his sister. If we
are trying to establish equality in jobs, I am for it, but I am for making white women equal,
also." Moreover, Congressman Andrews argued that "[u]nless this amendment is adopted, the
white women of this country would be drastically discriminated against in favor of a Negro
woman." Id. at 2583.
6. See, e.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971); Toscano v.
Nimmo, 570 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (D. Del. 1983).
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Title VII to protect men; 7 individuals subjected to sexual harassment;8 mar-
ried women; 9 women with pre-school age children; 0 and unwed mothers."
Courts have refused, however, to interpret the word sex in Title VII as
covering homosexuals 2 or "effeminate" men. 3
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 4 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether employment discrimination against
transsexuals constituted discrimination based on sex, as proscribed by Title
VII.1 The Ulane court refused to interpret the word sex in Title VII to
protect transsexuals for three reasons: (1) the plain meaning of the word sex
in Title VII;' 6 (2) the legislative history of Title VII; 7 and (3) congressional
rejection of bills to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 8
By denying Title VII protection to transsexuals, the Ulane court has forced
transsexuals to seek protection against employment discrimination from Con-
gress. It is extremely unlikely, however, that a group as politically powerless,
socially unpopular, and numerically small as transsexuals can persuade Con-
gress to amend Title VII to protect them.' 9 Therefore, after Ulane, trans-
sexuals are realistically precluded from seeking protection from employment
discrimination.
This Note examines the assumptions made by the Ulane court and suggests
that the court failed to accord a proper liberal interpretation to a remedial
statute such as Title VII. Additionally, this Note criticizes the Ulane court
7. See Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (an airline could not exclude
men from jobs as flight attendants).
8. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (plaintiff claimed her supervisor
abolished her job after she rebuked his sexual advances). Courts have also extended Title VII
to cover instances of sexual harassment by a homosexual. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv.,
Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. I11. 1981); Barlow v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 30 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 233 (N.D. I11. 1980). For an excellent review of sexual harassment
claims arising under Title VII, see Hill & Behrens, Love in the Office: A Guide for Dealing
with Sexual Harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 30 DE PAUL L. REV.
581 (1981).
9. See Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (the court invalidated
defendant's rule that prohibited stewardesses from marrying), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971);
Jurinko v. Edward L. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (refusal to hire married
women violates Title VII). The legislative debate reveals that a congressman did briefly mention
the issue of married women employed as stewardesses. 110 CoNo. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks
of Congressman Bass).
10. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
11. See Jacobs v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 917
(1977).
12. See De Santis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Blum v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
13. See Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 1084.
16. Id. at 1085; see infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
17. 742 F.2d at 1085; see infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
18. 742 F.2d at 1085-86; see infra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
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for disregarding the trial court's findings, particularly the trial court's reliance
on medical testimony and medical evidence to define both transsexualism
and sex. Finally, this Note argues that the Ulane court erred by failing to
distinguish between transsexuals before and after their sexes are surgically
changed.
BACKGROUND
Simply Stated, "[a] transsexual is an individual anatomically of one sex
who firmly believes he [or she] belongs to the other sex." ' 0 Transsexuals are
not homosexuals or transvestites, although transsexuals superficially appear
to practice both homosexuality and transvestism. 21 Rather, transsexuals who
have not yet undergone sex reassignment surgery and are referred to as
preoperative transsexuals22 suffer because their gender identities-their own
feelings of masculinity or femininity-do not conform to their anatomies. 23
These individuals hope to align their gender identities and their anatomies
through sex reassignment surgery. After surgery, these individuals are known
as postoperative transsexuals. 24 Although these individuals after surgery no
longer feel that their genders conflict with their bodies, it is not certain
whether the underlying gender identity disorders cease. 25 Despite the ease
with which transsexualism is defined, courts and medical authorities cannot
agree as to which sex a postoperative transsexual belongs.26 Thus, it is crucial
20. Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 718, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); see M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 79-80, 355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (testimony of Dr. Charles L. lhlenfeld); TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX
REASSIGNMENT 487 (R. Green & J. Money ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as TRANSSEXUALISM AND
SEX REASSIGNMENT]; Money & Gaskins, Sex Reassignment, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 249, 251
(1970-71); Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo: The Search for a Legal Definition of Sex, 31
MD. L. REV. 236 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo].
21. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976).
23. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum-Transsexuals in Athletics, 1 COMM/ENT 369,
374-76 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Legal Conundrum]. The distinction between
sex and gender still confuses courts and legal commentators. See Gould, Sex, Gender, and the
Need for Legal Clarity: The Case of Transsexualism, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 423, 449 (1979) (the
author criticizes the courts and legal commentators for seeking to enunciate a legal standard
for sex without first distinguishing between sex and gender). Dr. Robert J. Stoller of the
University of California at Los Angeles School of Medicine described gender identity as one's
sense of masculinity or femininity and sex as the biological attributes that cause someone to
be male or female. Stoller, A Contribution to the Study of Gender Identity, 45 INT'L J.
PSYCHOANALYSIS 220, 226 (1964). At least one commentator expects most courts to follow Dr.
Stoller's distinction. Twardy, Medicolegal Aspects of Transsexualism, 1980 MED. TRIAL TECH.
Q. 249, 257.
24. See, e.g., M. T. v. J. T., 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.'
1976).
25. See Graham, Transsexualism and the Capacity to Enter Marriage, 41 JURIST 117, 122-
23 (1981).
26. See Frances B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc. 2d 112, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
The court quoted Dr. George Burou, who claimed to have performed more than seven hundred
sex reassignment operations: "I don't change men into women. I transform male genitals into
genitals that have a female aspect. All the rest is in the patient's mind." Id. at 117-18, 355
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to a Title VII sex discrimination analysis to examine the factors that constitute
an individual's sex. 27 Only then can one determine whether sex reassignment
surgery changes an individual's sex.
A. Transsexuals- What Are They?
An individual's sex is normally determined at birth by an attending
physician who makes a visual observation of the infant's external genitalia. 2
The medical community and legal commentators, however, recognize at least
eight factors that cause society to label an individual as either male or
female:2 9 (1) chromosome pattern;30 (2) presence of ovaries or testes;31 (3)
sex hormone pattern;3 2 (4) reproductive organs; 33 (5) external genitalia;3 4 (6)
N.Y.S.2d at 717. But see Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 93 Misc. 2d 713, 400 N.Y.S.2d
267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). The court quoted Dr. Leo Wollman, who claimed to have treated
more than 1,700 transsexuals: "[The plaintiff] has the external genital appearance, the internal
organ appearance, gonadal identity, endocrinological make-up and psychological and social
development of a female [and should therefore] be considered a female . I d. at 720, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 271.
27. H. BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 5-9 (1969) (nine factors); Money, The
Sex Chromatin and Psychosexual Differentiation, in THE SEX CHROMATIN (K. Moore ed. 1966)
(seven factors); Moore, Recent Developments Concerning the Criteria of Sex and Possible Legal
Implications, 31 MANITOBA B. NEWS 104, 104-10 (1959) (eight factors).
28. In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 815, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836-37 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1968).
29. These eight factors are patterned after the list compiled by Dr. John Money of the
Johns Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic. The legal community has relied on these eight factors
more than any other set of variables. See Comment, M.T. v. J.T.: An Enlightened Perspective
on Transsexualism, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 403, 404 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, M.T. v.
J.T.]; Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 374; Comment, Transsexualism, Sex
Reassignment Surgery, and the Law, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 963, 965 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Transsexualism].
30. A female will develop when sperm containing an X chromosome joins with the X
chromosome in the ovum. A male will develop when sperm containing a Y chromosome joins
with the X chromosome in the ovum. See J. MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY 15-21 (1968).
Determining an individual's sex based on his or her chromosome composition has been criticized
as being unfair to transsexuals and hermaphrodites. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra
note 23, at 382; Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 966. For a definition of a
hermaphrodite, see infra note 38.
31. The gonadal standard as a determinant of sex has been criticized by legal commentators
because the hermaphrodite possesses gonads of both sexes and the transsexual's gonadal tissue
is removed during sex reassignment surgery. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note
23 at 376; Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 967.
32. Legal commentators have rejected the sex hormone standard because the sex reassignment
process involves the administration of drugs and castration, both of which drastically alter an
individual's hormonal balance. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 377;
Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 967.
33. Considering an individual's reproductive organs, such as a male's sperm ducts or a
female's uterus, when determining sex has been criticized because hermaphrodites possess both
male and female internal genitalia and the transsexual's internal genitalia is removed during
sex reassignment surgery. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 377; Comment,
Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 967.
34. External genitalia has been criticized as a factor because these organs are often removed
during sex reassignment procedure. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 378.
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sex assigned at birth;15 (7) secondary sex characteristics;3 6 and (8) psycholog-
ical sex or gender identity.3 7 In most individuals these factors are consistent
with each other and the individual accordingly is designated as either male
or female."5 Preoperative transsexuals, however, are individuals whose gender
identities do not conform to their other sex factors. Thus, a preoperative
transsexual may have a female gender identity but have male chromosomes,
hormones, internal and external genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics,
and have been classified at birth as a male. a9 Nevertheless, such an individual
will believe himself to be a female who possesses a male's body. Sex
reassignment surgery and hormone treatment cause the transsexual's other
35. Doctors cannot always determine the sex of an infant immediately after birth, however,
if the infant is born with abnormalities or lacks genitalia altogether. Bartholomew, "Herma-
phrodites" and the Law, 2 MALAYA L. REV. 83, 88 (1960). Moreover, doctors have been sued
because they misidentified an infant's sex. See Kaufman v. Israel Zion Hosp., 183 Misc. 714,
51 N.Y.S.2d 412 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). In Kaufman, the parents sued for mental anguish
because they were informed that their newborn child was a female and several days later were
told that their child actually was a male. Id. at 714, 51 N.Y.S.2d at 412. The court held that
the plaintiffs did not prove any physical injury caused by the doctor's negligence. Id. at 715,
51 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
36. Because secondary sex characteristics such as body hair, muscle mass, and breasts are
amenable to change by hormonal drugs routinely taken by transsexuals, commentators have
claimed this factor is unreliable. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 378.
37. Many legal commentators have favored psychological sex or gender identity as the most
important determinant of an individual's legal sex. See Holloway, Transsexuals-Their Legal
Sex, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 282, 295 (1968) (transsexuals' legal sex for purposes of birth records
should be based on their gender identity); Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at
379 (the author called this factor "appealing because it humanely recognizes the sex that the
individual has felt himself to be all along"); Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 968-
69 (the author correctly predicted that courts would not favor the gender identity factor because
it is subjective); Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 20, at 254 (the most important
factors are psychological identity and anatomical appearance); Comment, Transsexuals in Search
of Legal Acceptance: The Constitutionality of the Chromosome Test, 15 SAN DIEoo L. REV.
331, 355 (1978) (courts should determine sex based on an individual's gender identity and
anatomical appearance) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Transsexuals in Search of Legal Ac-
ceptance].
Nevertheless, legal commentators realize that all eight factors should be considered by courts.
See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 379-80. However, one commentator
warns that courts should not base determinations of sex on a test that looks only to a simple
majority of agreeing factors. Such a test would be inaccurate because it incorrectly assumes
that each factor is of equal significance. See Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 966.
38. J. MONEY, supra note 30, at 85. Nevertheless, a court requirement that all factors agree
is unrealistic because all the factors will not be in agreement for transsexuals. Comment,
Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 968. Moreover, there are a number of different types of
individuals whose chromosomes or hormones produce an ambiguous sexual status. Androgen
insensitive persons exhibit the male XY chromosome pattern yet have a vagina and physically
appear as females because their bodies respond to the female hormone estrogen, rather than
the male hormone androgen. D. FEDERMAN, ABNORMAL SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT 105-11 (1967).
Hermaphrodites possess both male and female reproductive organs. Individuals with Klinefelter's
Syndrome are sterile males with an XXY chromosome pattern instead of the normal male XY
pattern. Individuals with Turner's Syndrome are sterile females with an XO chromosome pattern
instead of the normal female XY pattern. Metafemales are females with an XXX chromosome
pattern. J. MONEY & A. EHRHARDT, MAN AND WOMAN, BOY AND GIRL 29-35 (1972).
39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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sex factors to coincide with his or her gender identity. Thus, a postoperative
transsexual may have a female gender identity, hormones, internal and
external genitalia, and secondary sex characteristics. 40 Nonetheless, because
an individual's chromosomes and sex assigned at birth cannot be altered,
these factors would still designate the individual as a male. 41
The transsexual develops his or her gender identity disorder early in
childhood 2. 4  The transsexual often is said to feel like a female trapped in a
male's body or vice versa. 43 The cause of this gender identity disorder is
disputed." The disorder can become extremely severe, often leading to anxiety
and depression 45 that can culminate in suicide or self-mutilation of the
external genitalia. 46
Although transsexuals are often confused with homosexuals and transves-
tites, the three types of individuals are considered to be distinct by most
legal and medical authorities. 47 Transsexuals are individuals who suffer from
40. For a discussion of how transsexuals' bodies are altered, see infra text accompanying
notes 58-59.
41. See Comment, A Legal Conundrum, supra note 23, at 373.
42. Benjamin & Ihlenfeld, Transsexualism, 73 AM. J. NURSING 457 (1973). Estimates vary
on the number of transsexuals that exist. See Lothstein, Sex Reassignment Surgery: Historical,
Bioethical, and Theoretical Issues, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 417 (1982) (30,000 transsexuals,
10,000 in the United States); Twardy, supra note 23, at 253 (5,000 operated transsexuals and
40,000 to 50,000 unoperated transsexuals in the United States); Wein & Remmers, Employment
Protection and Gender Dysphoria: Legal Definitions of Unequal Treatment on the Basis of Sex
and Disability, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1075, 1086 n.73 (1979) (3,000 postoperative transsexuals);
Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 29, at 964 n.5 (estimates of transsexuals living in the
United States range from 10,000 to 100,000, including transvestites). It is estimated that male-
to-female transsexuals outnumber female-to-male transsexuals by a ratio as high as eight to one
and as low as two to one. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 263 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-l1l].
DSM-III consists of findings of observable symptoms that are classified under mental disorders
with defined properties. Id. at 6. Follow-up studies are used to test the categories of disorders.
Id. at 5. The objective of DSM-II1 is to provide criteria for greater uniformity of expert
opinion. Id. at 5.
43. See Wise, Transsexualism: A Clinical Approach to Gender Dysphoria, 1983 MED. TRIAL
TECH. Q. 167; Comment, The Law and Transsexualism: A Faltering Response to a Conceptual
Dilemma, 7 CONN. L. REV. 288 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Law and Transsex-
ualism]. There have been a number of books written about the transsexual's plight. See C.
CONN, CANARY, THE STORY OF A TRANSSEXUAL (1977); F. FALLOWELL & A. ASHLEY, APRIL
ASHLEY'S ODYSSEY (1982); N. HOYER, MAN INTO WOMAN (1933); C. JORGENSON, C. JORGENSON:
A PERSONAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967).
44. Graham, supra note 25, at 118; Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 20, at
238.
45. DSM-11l, supra note 42, at 263; see also Wise, supra note 43, at 183-97 (case studies
on various types of individuals who seek sex reassignment surgery).
46. DSM-11I, supra note 42, at 263. Self-mutilation often occurs because transsexuals are
disgusted by their own genitals. See LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES
AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES 103 (Frankel ed. Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as LAWYERS' MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA].
47. See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 77-78 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Bullough, Bullough &
Smith, A Comparative Study of Male Transvestites, Male to Female Transsexuals, and Male
Homosexuals, 19 J. SEX RESEARCH 238, 238-57 (1983); Matto, The Transsexual in Society, 1972
CRIMINOLOGY 85, 86-89; Rollin, Transsexualism Observed, 285 BRIT. MED. J. 461 (1982).
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gender identity disorders. 48 Homosexuals are individuals who are attracted
sexually to members of their own sex.4 9 Transvestites are men who experience
psychological relief and sexual arousal by dressing in women's clothes.5 0
Frequently, the preoperative male transsexual acts and dresses like both an
effeminate homosexual and a transvestite." The preoperative transsexual,
however, is neither a homosexual nor a transvestite. For example, a male
preoperative transsexual is attracted to men in a heterosexual sense.5 2 Because
the male preoperative transsexual considers himself to be a female, he does
not consider his sexual attraction to men to be homosexual. 3 The same is
true of female preoperative transsexuals who are attracted sexually to fe-
males.14
Likewise, the male preoperative transsexual should not be confused with
the transvestite. Unlike the transvestite, the male preoperative transsexual
does not derive sexual arousal from cross-dressing. The male preoperative
transsexual dresses like a female either because he psychologically considers
himself to be a female or because he is fulfilling the requirement of his
doctors that prior to sex reassignment surgery he act and dress like a female.16
Futhermore, homosexuals and transvestites are content with their sexual
status and do not seek sex reassignment surgery. 7 Preoperative transsexuals,
on the other hand, often seek sex reassignment surgery to alleviate the
discomfort caused by their gender identity disorder. The sex reassignment
process in an individual born as a biological male consists primarily of some
or all of the following procedures: the administration of the female hormone
estrogen to initiate the development of breasts; the construction of a vagina
from the penile shaft; the amputation of the testicles; the removal of facial
hair with electrolysis; and the surgical alteration of voice pitch." The alter-
ation for an individual born as a biological female consists primarily of
some or all of the following procedures: the administration of the male
hormone testosterone to alter voice pitch and promote growth of body hair;
48. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
49. Benjamin & lhlenfeld, supra note 42, at 460.
50. TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEx REASSIGNMENT, supra note 20, at 487. The term transvestism
has only been applied to males. See DSM-III, supra note 42, at 269.
51. Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 20, at 238.
52. Id.
53. Id; see also DSM-III supra note 42, at 269 (unlike homosexuals and transvestites,
transsexuals do not derive sexual pleasure from their genitals, but rather wish to be rid of
them).
54. Comment, Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 20, at 238-39.
55. The primary characteristic of transvestism is cross-dressing. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
56. Money & Gaskins, supra note 20, at 259-60. The current treatment requires, in part,
that the preoperative transsexual act and dress as a member of the opposite sex for six months
to two years before surgery will be performed. LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note
46, at 103.
57. See supra note 53.
58. See LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46, at 103; Twardy, supra note 23, at
260-63.
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the removal of the breasts, uterus, and ovaries; and the construction of a
penis and scrotum.5 9 None of the postoperative transsexuals can reproduce,
although they can engage in sexual intercourse.6 °
Sex reassignment surgery for individuals suffering from gender identity
disorders dates back to 1931.61 Since that time, a number of clinics that
specialize in sex reassignment surgery have been established at major medical
schools. 62 It was not until 1980, however, that the American Psychiatric
Association formally categorized transsexualism as a mental disorder. 63 De-
spite this categorization, transsexualism and sex reassignment surgery are
still the subjects of controversy and debate in the medical community. Many
medical authorities argue that psychotherapy is useless with transsexuals and
that only sex reassignment surgery alleviates the transsexual's gender identity
disorder by altering the individual's body to conform to his or her self-
conception. 64 In fact, studies have found that most patients reported being
satisfied with the sex reassignment surgery and their new identities. 61 Other
medical authorities, however, argue that the proper treatment for transsex-
ualism is psychotherapy, not sex reassignment surgery. 66 These authorities
argue that although sex reassignment surgery may be subjectively satisfying
to the individual, it does not cure the transsexual's gender identity disorder. 67
Futhermore, they argue that doctors lack acceptable diagnostic criteria for
selecting proper candidates for sex reassignment surgery and, as a result,
some individuals who were not true transsexuals have undergone such op-
erations 68
59. LAWYERS' MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 46, at 104.
60. Id.
61. See Meyer & Reter, Sex Reassignment, 36 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1010, 1010 (1979)
(citing Abraham, Genitalumwandlung an zuei maennlichen transvestiten, 18 Z Sexualwissen-
schafft 223 (1931)). The term "transsexualism" was first used in 1949. See Cauldwell, Psycho-
pathia Transsexualis, 16 SEXOLOGY 274 (1949). The term was popularized in 1953 by Dr. Henry
Benjamin, a pioneer in sex reassignment surgery. See Bullough, Bullough & Smith, supra note
47, at 240.
62. The Johns Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic, which opened in 1965, has been the most
well-known clinic specializing in treating individuals suffering from gender identity conflicts.
The clinic ceased performing sex reassignment surgery because of political pressure caused in
part by the Meyer and Reter study, Meyer & Reter, supra note 61. Lothstein, supra note 42,
at 422. The Meyer and Reter study concluded that "Islex reassignment surgery confers no
objective advantage in terms of social rehabilitation, although it remains subjectively satisfying
to those who have rigorously pursued a trial period and who have undergone it." Meyer &
Reter, supra note 61, at 1015.
63. DSM-Ill, supra note 42, at 261-64.
64. See Graham, supra note 25, at 123; Lothstein, supra note 42, at 417.
65. For an analysis of studies conducted on transsexuals through the 1970's, most of which
reported widespread patient satisfaction, see Lothstein, supra note 42, at 417-24.
66. See Lothstein, supra note 42, at 417.
67. See id.
68. See id. Although Lothstein reviewed studies that reported patient satisfaction with surgery,
he found that many individuals continue to be misdiagnosed as transsexuals and should be
treated with psychotherapy rather than surgery. Thus, he predicted that "[ais clinicians learn
new ways to diagnose and treat transsexualism, either sex reassignment surgery will be abandoned
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Even after sex reassignment surgery, transsexuals often face a lack of
sympathy or acceptance from family, friends, and the public. 69 Although
postoperative transsexuals physically appear to be members of their new sex,
society has been hesitant to accept the transsexuals' new identities. Thus,
when this lack of acceptance has resulted in the denial of legal rights,
transsexuals have sought recourse from the judiciary.
B. Transsexuals and the Law
Transsexuals pose difficult questions for courts before,70 during, 7' and
after 72 sex reassignment surgery. Significantly, there is a trend among courts
to recognize the transsexual's peculiar legal status and to interpret laws in a
liberal fashion to benefit them. For example, preoperative transsexuals are
faced with a dilemma caused by the requirement that they cross-dress for a
number of months prior to sex reassignment surgery. 73 A number of juris-
dictions have laws that impose criminal liability for cross-dressing in public
places. 74 Recently, however, courts have failed to find a legitimate state
interest sufficient to allow such an infringement on the preoperative trans-
sexual's constitutional right to cross-dress. 75 The state's alleged interests,
as a routine treatment modality (reserved for only a few select patients) or new predictive
variables for choosing suitable patients for sex reassignment surgery will be established." Id.
at 424.
69. See Matto, supra note 47, at 97-99, 102-103; Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at 1086,
1094.
70. The preoperative transsexual's gender identity crisis can lead to a number of adverse
legal consequences. For example, it is reported that thirty-two states prohibit homosexual
behavior. Twardy, supra note 23, at 300. Thus, a preoperative transsexual who engages in
sexual relations with an individual of the same sex could face criminal liability even though he
or she considers such sexual conduct heterosexual. See supra text accompanying note 53.
71. For a discussion of the surgeon's potential criminal liability for statutory mayhem,
battery, diagnostic malpractice and failure to gain informed consent, see Note, Is He or Isn't
She? Transsexualism: Legal Impediments to Integrating a Product of Medical Definition and
Technology, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 342, 365-71 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Is He or Isn't
She].
72. One court has found a postoperative transsexual qualified to retain child custody.
Christian v. Randall, 33 Colo. App. 129, 516 P.2d 132 (1973). However, courts have declined
to strike down army regulations that disqualify transsexuals from military service. Doe v.
Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900 (D. Minn. 1981). One interesting question not yet presented to
courts is the effect of transsexual surgery on an individual's rights under testamentary wills.
For example, one legal commentator argues that a male-to-female transsexual might have to
initiate litigation if the individual's parent bequeathed property to "my son." Comment,
Transsexuals in Limbo, supra note 20, at 247-51.
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
74. See Comment, M.T. v. J.T., supra note 29, at 411 (listing ten states that have laws
that could be used to prosecute the transsexual for cross-dressing).
75. See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (the ordinance violated trans-
sexuals' fourteenth amendment rights against deprivation of liberty); City of Chicago v. Wilson,
75 I11. 2d 525, 531, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1978) ("[tlhe notion that the state can regulate one's
personal appearance, unconfined by any constitutional strictures whatsoever, is fundamentally
inconsistent with 'values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity that the
• ..Constitution was designed to protect.' ").
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which courts have found unsubstantiated by the evidence, include (1) pre-
venting citizens from being misled or defrauded; (2) aiding in the description
and detection of criminals; (3) preventing crimes in washrooms; and (4)
preventing inherently antisocial conduct. 76 Thus, courts have found ordi-
nances prohibiting cross-dressing unconstitutional as applied to preoperative
transsexuals who cross-dress in preparation for sex reassignment surgery. 77
In addition to being relieved from potential criminal liability for cross-
dressing, preoperative transsexuals have recently been given the right to
receive medicaid payments7a for sex reassignment surgery. Medicaid payments
are only given for "necessary medical services." ' 79 Courts had previously
concluded that sex reassignment surgery was not a necessary medical service. 0
Recently, however, courts have ordered payments to transsexuals for their
surgery. In Doe v. State Department of Public Welfare,8 the court held that
medical necessity must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 2 Thus, the
court ruled that the state welfare department erred by routinely denying
medicaid payments based on a physician's handbook that excluded sex
reassignment surgery from medical coverage. s3 The court also found that the
state welfare department mistakenly required the plaintiff to prove that the
surgery would eliminate his disability and render him self-supporting. 4 The
court held that under this approach needy patients such as cancer victims
would also have to be denied medicaid funds because they could not prove
that their treatment would be successful.85 Likewise, other courts have or-
dered medicaid payments for sex reassignment surgery after finding that
76. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 I11. 2d 525, 532, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1978).
77. See Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76, 81 (S.D.Tex. 1980); City of Chicago v. Wilson,
75 I11. 2d 525, 534, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1978).
78. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982); see Note, Medicaid
Funding for Transsexual Surgery, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1037 (1979).
79. Medicaid was enacted in 1965 to enable "each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish . . .medical assistance . . . [to those] whose income and
resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(1982).
In Lothstein, supra note 42, at 418, the author cautioned that "[i]f sex reassignment surgery
becomes a Medicaid-subsidized procedure, it could be performed on many nontranssexual
patients with gender dysphoria, who may later regret their decisions." Thus, Lothstein argued
that "[ilt is imperative that legislators who wish to provide Medicaid payments for transsexual
surgery understand that, in most cases, alternatives to sex reassignment surgery are available
to patients." Id. at 424.
80. See, e.g., Denise R. v. Lavine, 39 N.Y.2d 279, 347 N.E.2d 893, 383 N.Y.S.2d 568
(1976) (the director of social services acted within his discretion in weighing conflicting testimony
as to the plaintiff's need for a sex-change operation).
81. 257 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977).
82. Id. at 820.
83. Id. at 819-21.
84. Id. at 820-21; accord 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c), (d) (1984) ("The Medicaid agency may
not arbitrarily deny . . . the amount, duration, or scope of a required service .. . to an
otherwise eligible recipient solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition" although
the agency may require medical necessity).
85. 257 N.W.2d at 821.
1985] ULANE v. EASTERN
such surgery was not merely cosmetic 6 or that such surgery was the only
treatment available to the transsexual.8 7
After transsexuals undergo sex reassignment surgery, they often seek to
change their legal names to conform to their postoperative appearances.
Additionally, postoperative transsexuals often seek to change the sex desig-
nation on their birth certificates. Name changes are routinely granted to
individuals, including postoperative transsexuals, provided that the individ-
uals do not request the name change to perpetrate a fraud or interfere with
the rights of third parties. 8
In contrast, postoperative transsexuals have not routinely been granted sex
designation changes on their birth certificates. Initially, only three states
allowed such action.8 9 Presently, statutes in at least seventeen states specif-
ically permit postoperative transsexuals to have new birth certificates issued
or to have their birth certificates amended to reflect their new appearances.-
Prior to the past decade, postoperative transsexuals infrequently received
judicial relief because courts initially were reluctant to change the sex listed
on birth certificates absent clear statutory authority.9' Courts in the past ten
86. See G.B. v. Lackner, 80 Cal. App. 3d 64, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1978); J.D. v. Lackner,
80 Cal. App. 3d 90, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1978). In both G.B. and J.D., the courts held that
the Director of the California Department of Health arbitrarily denied benefits after erroneously
concluding that surgery to change the external appearance of the genitalia is cosmetic and,
thus, not covered under California's medical assistance program. But see Rush v. Parham, 625
F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980) (upholding a Georgia Medicaid plan, which expressly excluded
payments for cosmetic and "experimental surgery, e.g. transsexual operations").
87. See Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980) (sex reassignment surgery was
medically necessary because it was the only treatment available for plaintiff); Davidson v. Aetna
Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 101 Misc. 2d 1, 420 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (ordering
an employee medical plan insurer to pay for sex reassignment surgery because the surgery was
imperative and necessary for the employee to lead a normal life).
88. See In re Anonymous, 57 Misc. 2d 813, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) (desire
of transsexual to have her name match her postoperative appearance is a reasonable ground
for granting a name change); accord In re Anonymous, 64 Misc. 2d 309, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970).
89. See Note, Is He or Isn't She, supra note 71, at 344 n.12 (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 36-326 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. III 1/2, § 73-17 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:336
(West 1976)).
90. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-512(d) (1983);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10475 (West Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) (Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e) (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(e) (Supp.
1983); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2, § 73-17 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144.23-24 (West Supp.
1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.62 (West Supp. 1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 13
(West Supp. 1984); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2831-.2832 (1980); MISS. CODE ANN. §
41-57-21 (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-
118(b)(4) (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 432.290(5) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (Supp.
1983); VA. CODE § 32.1-269(E) (Supp. 1983).
New York has issued new birth certificates for about 20 transsexuals to reflect their changed
sex in accordance with N.Y. Pua. HEALTH LAW §4176 (McKinney 1977). That statute permits
correction of "errors" or "defects." Id.; see Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at 1080 n.25.
91. See Hartin v. Director of Bureau of Records, 79 Misc. 2d 229, 232, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515,
518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (using the same reasons as the Weiner court to hold that "surgery
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years, however, have ordered such changes, recognizing that postoperative
transsexuals have a substantial interest in changing the sex designations on
their birth certificates.92
Perhaps the most far-reaching case to determine the rights of transsexuals
concerned the legality of transsexual marriages. In M.T. v. J.T.,9 the court
upheld the validity of a marriage between a male-to-female transsexual and
a male. 94 The M.T. court, which was the first to uphold a transsexual's
marriage,95 ruled that an individual's sex should not be determined solely by
his or her chromosomes.96 In so holding, the court rejected the rationale of
Corbett v. Corbett,97 an English case that was the leading decision in this
area. 98 In Corbett, the court held that an individual's sex is determined by
his or her chromosomes and genitalia at birth. 99 In essence, according to
Corbett, an individual born with male chromosomes and genitalia could
never be transformed surgically into a woman. 1° The M. T. court, however,
for the transsexual is an experimental form of psychotherapy by which mutilating surgery is
conducted on a person with the intent of setting his mind at ease, and that nonetheless, does
not change the body cells governing sexuality); Anonymous v. Weiner, 50 Misc. 2d 380, 382-
83, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (denying mandamus to compel the depart-
ment of health to change the sex designation on a transsexual's birth certificate for three
reasons: (I) male-to-female transsexuals, such as plaintiff, remain chromosomally male; (2) it
is questionable whether the law and birth certificate records should be used to aid the social
adaptation of psychologically ill persons; and (3) the public interest to prevent fraud outweighs
the transsexual's interest in the change of sex on the birth record).
92. See Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975) (holding that the Connecticut
Commissioner of Health must show a substantial state interest to justify a policy of refusing
any changes in the sex designation on birth certificates of postoperative transsexuals); K. v.
Health Div., 26 Or. App. 311, 552 P.2d 840 (1976) (finding that the court had the power to
order a change of sex designation in a birth certificate of a postoperative transsexual). In
Comment, The Law and Transsexualism, supra note 43, at 310, the author argued that a birth
certificate that failed to reflect the new appearance of the postoperative transsexual ignored
"the socially most important sex identifying characteristics-genitalia and secondary sex char-
acteristics. The claim is that the postoperative transsexual is no longer 'ill,' if ever he was, that
the sex reassignment surgery is the adjustment which rectifies his condition, and that society
ought to recognize the change."
93. 140 N.J. Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204 (N.Y. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
94. Id. at 90, 355 A.2d at 211.
95. Marriage has been defined as the "[l]egal union of one man and one woman as husband
and wife." See Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 247, 254, 522 P.2d 1187, 1193 (1974). Statutes
also have mandated that marriages occur only between individuals of the opposite sex. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (Supp. 1980). Thus, homosexuals consistently have been denied the right
to marry under the law. See Comment, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J.
573 (1973).
96. 140 N.J. Super. at 86, 355 A.2d at 208-09.
97. [1970] 2 W.L.R. 1306, 2 All E.R. 33.
98. See Comment, M.T. v. J.T., supra note 29, at 417-18.
99. [1970] 2 W.L.R. at 1325, 2 All E.R. at 47.
100. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a male and could not perform the
"essential role of a woman in marriage." Id. at 1324-25, 2 All E.R. at 48.
Transsexuals also were denied the right to marry in Frances B. v. Mark B., 78 Misc. 2d 112,
355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). The court granted an annulment in part based on
fraud and in part because the husband, a female-to-male transsexual, was unable to impregnate
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determined an individual's sex based on his or her anatomy and gender
identity.' 10 The court held that the plaintiff, a male-to-female transsexual,
had "become physically and psychologically unified and fully capable of
sexual activity consistent with her reconciled sexual attributes of gender and
anatomy. Consequently, plaintiff should be considered a member of the
female sex for marital purposes."' 12
C. Transsexuals and Title VII
Title VII was intended to remove "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment" that served to discriminate based on impermissible
classifications such as sex. 103 Thus, Title VII is a remedial statute that must
be liberally construed.' °4 In fact, the Supreme Court has cautioned lower
federal courts to "avoid interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of
discrimination of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate. "105 The
lower federal courts have responded by extending Title VII coverage to
situations perhaps not envisioned by Congress in 1964.106 The reasoning
asserted by these courts in extending Title VII was best expressed by Judge
Goldberg of the Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC:
Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory prac-
tices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious
activities. Rather, it pursued the path of wisdom by being uncon-
strictive, knowing that constant change is the order of our day and
that the seemingly reasonable practices of the present can easily
become the injustices of the morrow. 10 7
his wife. The court held that "the marriage relationship exists with the result and for the
purpose of begetting offspring." Id. at 117, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 717. Legal commentators have
criticized the court for implying that sterility rather than capacity for intercourse governs the
validity of a marriage. Comment, The Law and Transsexualism, supra note 43, at 321; Twardy,
supra note 23, at 277.
101. 140 N.J. Super. at 89, 355 A.2d at 210-11.
102. Id. at 89-90, 355 A.2d at 211.
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
104. See Jefferies v. Harris Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). In
Jefferies the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII protected black women from employment discrim-
ination. Id. at 1032. The court noted that Title VII did not specifically prohibit discrimination
against black women as a class, although the Act did proscribe discrimination based on race
or sex. Id. The court found that Title VII proscribed discrimination directed at black women
as a class because they reasonably fell within the Act's ambit and there was no clear legislative
intent not to protect black women as a class separate and distinct from a class consisting of
all women or a class consisting of all blacks. Id. For additional examples of how courts liberally
construe Title VII, see EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1982);
Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
105. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981) (emphasis added). The
court also held that Title VII was "intended to be broadly inclusive." Id. at 170.
106. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
107. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rogers, the plaintiff was a
Hispanic who claimed that her employer created a discriminatory and offensive work environ-
ment by discriminating against Hispanic clients. Id. at 237. The Fifth Circuit held that Title
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Thus, sex discrimination occurs whenever an individual's sex, for no
legitimate reason, is a substantial factor in the discrimination. 0 Moreover,
the discrimination does not need to occur solely because of the individual's
sex."°9 Rather, a prima facie violation of Title VII occurs whenever the
discrimination is based at least partly, yet firmly, on the individual's sex."10
The Supreme Court has held that a discriminatory employment practice can
violate Title VII regardless of an employer's intent or motivation.' Thus,
it is not necessary for the employee to show a discriminatory intent of the
employer. Finally, Title VII only allows a sex-based distinction in employ-
ment if that distinction is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for the
particular job." 2
Despite the advances made in other areas of the law, neither preoperative
nor postoperative transsexuals have gained Title VII protection from em-
ployment discrimination. With the exception of the trial court in Ulane,"3
no court has held that the Title VII ban on sex discrimination protects
transsexuals." 4 Five courts have considered preoperative transsexuals' claims
that Title VII protects them." ' In each case the court rejected the preoperative
transsexual's arguments for three reasons. The leading case, Holloway v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 is representative of how these courts have resolved
the Title VII claims of preoperative transsexuals.
In Holloway, the plaintiff was terminated after informing his supervisor
that he was undergoing treatment in preparation for sex reassignment sur-
VII was intended not only to proscribe discriminatory hirings and firings, but also discriminatory
work environments. Id. at 238.
Another example of judicial expansion of Title VII occured in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934. (D.C. Cir. 1981). In that case the plaintiff claimed that she was subjected to sexual
harassment. Id. at 239. The court held that Title VII should not be limited to discrimination
based solely on sex, but rather should be interpreted to proscribe discrimination when a victim's
sex was a substantial factor. Id. at 942. After finding that the plaintiff's sex was a substantial
factor in her discriminatory treatment, the courts held that sexual harassment was discrimination
based on sex in violation of Title VII. Id. at 948.
108. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
990 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
109. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
110. Id. at 991.
Ill. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see also Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 239 (1972) (the employer's failure to discriminate intentionally against plaintiff held not
material to a finding of a Title VII violation).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982). Title VII does not permit a bona fide occupational
qualification with respect to an employee's race. Id.
113. 581 F. Supp. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1983), rev'd, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). For a discussion
of the district court's opinion in Ulane, see infra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
114. See Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur
Andersen and Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Terry v. EEOC, 25 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
31,638 (E.D. Wis. 1980); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. Md. 1977); Grossman
v. Bernards Township Bd. of Educ., II Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196 (D.N.J. 1975);
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
115. See cases cited supra note 114.
116. 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977).
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gery."' 7 First, the court held that the legislative history regarding the inclusion
of the word sex in Title VII did not reveal a congressional intent to protect
transsexuals." ' Consequently, the Holloway court refused to interpret Title
VII to cover transsexuals in the absence of clear legislative intent."19
Second, the Holloway court examined the plain meaning of the word
sex. 120 The court noted that the dictionary defined sex differently than it
defined gender.' 2 ' Thus, because sex was not synonymous with gender, 22 the
court concluded that Congress did not intend discrimination based on sex,
which Title VII prohibits, to include the type of discrimination from which
transsexuals suffer-discrimination based on gender.123
Third, the Holloway court considered the fact that Congress had repeatedly
rejected bills to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
preference.' 24 Although these bills were intended to protect homosexuals, 21
the Holloway court ruled that their rejection proved that Congress intended
a traditional meaning of the word sex in Title VII. 1 2 6 The court, however,
did note that transsexuals would be protected by Title VII if they claimed
discrimination because they were males or females. 27 Because the plaintiff
in Holloway claimed discrimination solely because she was a transsexual, the
court denied Title VII protection.
21
Judge Goodwin, dissenting in Holloway, argued that employers who dis-
117. Id. at 661.
118. Id. at 662; accord Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Voyles
v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
119. 566 F.2d at 663.
120. Id. at 662; accord Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Powell
v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 371 (D. Md. 1977).
121. 566 F.2d at 662 n.4.
122. For a discussion of the meaning of gender, see supra note 23.
123. 566 F.2d at 662; Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Med. Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D.
Cal. 1975)(Title VII "speaks of discrimination on the basis of one's 'sex.' No mention is made
of change of sex or sexual preference.")
124. 566 F.2d at 662 & n.6 ("Three such bills were presented to the 94th Congress: HR
5452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); HR 166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) and HR 2667, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Seven have been presented to the 95th Congress: HR 451, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977); HR 2998, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); HR 4794, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
HR 5239, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); HR 7775, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); HR 8268, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) and HR 8269, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)"). In Ulane, 742 F.2d 1081,
1085 n. II (7th Cir. 1984), the court of appeals noted additional failed congressional attempts
to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on "affectational or sexual orientation":
H.R. 1454, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 2074, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
125. See, e.g., H.R. 1454, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ("the term 'affectational or sexual
orientation' means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by orientation
or practice, by and between consenting adults."); see also 121 CONG. REC. 1441 (1975) (Rep.
Abzug prefaced the introduction of H.R. 5452, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), by stating that
the bill was intended to prohibit discrimination against homosexuals), cited in Voyles, 403 F.
Supp. at 457 n.2.
126. 566 F.2d at 662; accord Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982).
127. 566 F.2d at 664.
128. Id.
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charge postoperative transsexuals because they have changed their sex would
violate Title VII because the terminations would necessarily be based on
sex. 29 Thus, Judge Goodwin found no rational reason to deny Title VII
protection to an employee discharged a few days prior to sex reassignment
surgery, yet grant Title VII protection to an employee terminated immediately
after such surgery. 30 Judge Goodwin reasoned that both actions by an
employer result in the employee's discharge based on sex.' Therefore, Judge
Goodwin concluded that the case should have been remanded for a trial on
the merits. 3
2
A New Jersey district court, in Grossman v. Board of Education,'33 was
the only court prior to Ulane to consider the Title VII claims of a postop-
erative transsexual. In Grossman, the plaintiff was a schoolteacher who was
terminated because her presence in the classroom allegedly would psycho-
logically harm her students. 3 4 The district court denied Title VII protection
to the plaintiff because it found that she had been discriminated against not
because she was a female, but rather because she surgically changed her sex
from male to female.' The Grossman court, unlike the dissent in Holloway,
did not conclude that discrimination based on the change of one's sexual
status is necessarily based on sex.'3 6 To the contrary, the court stated that
discrimination based on sex would have occurred if plaintiff had been
terminated because of her employer's stereotypical view of the abilities of
women or because of any condition common only to women, such as
pregnancy.' After holding that the plaintiff was not discriminated against
as a female, the court analyzed whether Title VII protected any discrimination
against her as a transsexual.' The court concluded that discrimination based
on an individual's status as a transsexual was not covered by Title VII
because the legislative history did not reflect such an intent nor did the plain
meaning of sex encompass transsexualism. 3 9
Hence, the district court and the court of appeals in Ulane were confronted
with the approaches of the six courts that denied Title VII protection to
transsexuals and the Holloway dissent, which argued that such protection
be given. The six courts basically asserted the same three reasons to reject
129. Id. at 664. (Goodwin, J., dissenting); see also Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at I100
(arguing that discharging postoperative transsexuals because they changed sex would violate
Title VII).
130. 566 F.2d at 664 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 664-65 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
133. II Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1196 (D.N.J. 1975).
134. Id. at 1197.
135. Id. at 1198.
136. Id. at 1198-99.
137. Id. For a discussion of the particular issues raised by the termination of a tenured
transsexual teacher, see Note, Dismissal of a Transsexual From a Tenured Teaching Position
in a Public School, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 670.
138. 11 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. (BNA) at 1198-99.
139. Id.
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the argument that Title VII prohibited discrimination based on an individual's
transsexualism. '4 In addition, the Grossman court found that discrimination
based on a transsexual's change of sex could not be equated with discrimi-
nation based on sex for Title VII purposes.' 4' On the other hand, the
Holloway dissent argued that such discrimination was based on sex. Thus,
the Holloway dissent stated that Title VII should protect both postoperative
transsexuals and preoperative transsexuals who were discriminated against
because they wanted to change their sex.
42
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Until 1980, Karen Frances Ulane was a biological male known by the
name of Kenneth Ulane. 143 As Kenneth Ulane, the plaintiff earned a pilot's
license and served, with distinction, as an Army pilot in the Vietnam War. 144
In 1968 Eastern Airlines hired Ulane as a pilot. 45 Shortly before leaving the
military to join Eastern, Ulane underwent psychiatric and medical care
because he 46 considered himself to be a female who possessed a male's
body. 47 Ulane claimed to have had this self-perception since early child-
hood.' 41 Ulane eventually had female hormones, which caused breast devel-
opment, prescribed for him. 49
In September 1979, Eastern granted Ulane a leave of absence.' 50 Ulane
spent seven months preparing for sex reassignment surgery by living as a
female twenty-four hours a day.' 5' In April 1980, Ulane underwent sex
reassignment surgery.' 5 2 After surgery, Ulane requested and received changes
in her sex designation on various records. For example, the State of Illinois
140. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
143. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1082. In other words, Ulane was born with male chromosomes,
hormones, reproductive organs, external genitalia, secondary sex characteristics, and testes.
144. Id. at 1082.
145. Id. At the time of discharge, Ulane was a First Officer and flight instructor who had
logged more than 8,000 flight hours. Id. at 1082-83.
146. When referring to Ulane before sex reassignment surgery, the pronoun he will be used;
she will be used to refer to Ulane after surgery.
147. 742 F.2d at 1083.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Brief for Appellee at 7, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appelleel.
151. Id. For a discussion of this requirement and its legal implications, see supra notes 56,
73-75 and accompanying text.
152. Brief for Appellant at 5, Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. Ulane underwent surgery after successfully living as
a female for seven months and receiving the unanimous assent of the Gender Identity Board
of the University of Chicago Medical School. Id. at 7. The Gender Identity Board includes a
psychiatrist, a gynecologist, a urologist, a plastic surgeon, an endocrinologist, a general surgeon,
and the University's legal counsel. Id.
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issued a revised birth certificate noting that Ulane was a female.," In
addition, the Federal Aviation Administration certified Ulane for flight status
as a female. 54 When Ulane sought to return to her pilot's position at Eastern,
however, she was informed that she would not be reactivated.' 55 Instead,
Eastern terminated Ulane in April 1981 .56
Judge John F. Grady of the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that Ulane was fired because she was a transsexual 57 and held
that Title VII prohibited discrimination against transsexuals.5 8 The district
court reached this conclusion by noting that Title VII was a remedial statute
and therefore must be liberally construed.5 9 The court then found that
although the exact meaning of the word sex was disputed in the medical
community,60 the evidence at trial proved that the term as used in any
medical sense and as used in Title VII should reasonably be interpreted to
encompass "sexual identity.' ' 6' The court found that transsexuals suffer
from sexual identity disorders. 62 Thus, because the evidence showed that
Eastern discriminated against Ulane because of her sexual identity, and
because nontranssexuality was not a bona fide occupational qualification for
the job, the court held that Eastern violated Title VII.63
153. 742 F.2d at 1083. For a discussion of the law's response to the transsexual's request to
change the sex designation on his or her birth certificate, see supra notes 89-92 and accompanying
text.
154. 742 F.2d at 1083.
155. Brief for Appellee, supra note 150, at I.
156. Id.
157. 581 F. Supp. at 837. The district court described Ulane as follows: "She conducts
herself as a woman. She dresses as a woman. There is nothing flamboyant, nothing freakish,
about the plaintiff. It would take an extremely practiced eye, it seems to me, to detect any
difference between the plaintiff and the biological woman." Id. at 821. The district court also
placed great weight on the fact that Ulane was determined to be a transsexual by the Gender
Identity Board of the University of Chicago Medical School, id. at 825; see supra note 152,
the fact that Ulane's witnesses were credible when describing her as a transsexual, 581 F. Supp.
at 825, 831-32, and the fact that Ulane was an intelligent individual who carefully weighed the
decision to undergo sex reassignment surgery, id. at 825-27.
158. 581 F. Supp. at 825. The district judge later amended his findings to hold that Ulane
also had been discriminated against because she was a female in violation of Title VII. Id. at
839-40. The district court has not yet tried seven additional counts [as of the date of this
publication], "which allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3), 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (con-
spiracy), and 45 U.S.C. § 184 (Railway Labor Act), defamation, and intentional or reckless
causing of emotional and mental distress." 742 F.2d at 1082 n.l.
159. 581 F. Supp. at 824.
160. Id. at 823.
161. Id. at 825.
162. Id. at 823.
163. Id. at 825. It appears that the district court's reasoning also would afford Title VII
protection to preoperative transsexuals because they, too, can be subjected to discrimination
based on their sexual identity. In fact, in a prior motion to dismiss, the district judge relied on
Judge Goodwin's reasoning in Holloway to deny the defendant's motion. Ulane, 28 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1438, 1439 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The district judge stated that "the plaintiff
made a telling argument in her brief when she suggested that the firing was, in effect, a
statement that a condition of plaintiff's continued employment was that she remain a male.
And if that suggestion is valid, then clearly the allegations of the complaint show that the
discharge was because of sex." Id.
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On appeal, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court. 64 The court of appeals prefaced its
discussion by noting that other courts had not equated the word sex in Title
VII with sexual preference.' 65 The court then stated that even the district
court recognized that Title VII does not protect homosexuals and transves-
tites. 66 The court of appeals, however, disagreed with the district court that
Title VII could be interpreted to protect transsexuals but not homosexuals
or transvestites. 167 In fact, although the court of appeals found that the three
groups were distinct, it held that the reasons for denying Title VII protection
to homosexuals and transvestites were equally persuasive in denying protec-
tion to transsexuals. 168
The court of appeals relied on three reasons to support its holding that
Title VII did not protect transsexuals. 169 First, the court of appeals asserted
the rule of statutory construction that absent a specific definition, words
should be given their ordinary and common meaning. 70 The court held that
the word sex in Title VII meant a man or a woman, not an individual
suffering from a sexual identity disorder. 17' Second, the court of appeals
found that the legislative history of Title VII failed to reveal any congres-
sional intent to protect transsexuals.'7 Thus, the court concluded that the
legislature must have intended to apply the traditional meaning of the word
sex.'73 Third, the court of appeals stated that Congress repeatedly had rejected
attempts to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on an individ-
ual's "affectational or sexual orientation.' ' 74 The court recognized that these
bills were intended to protect homosexuals, but held that their rejection
"strongly indicate[d]" that Congress intended a narrow and traditional
interpretation of the word sex in Title VII.' 7
164. 742 F.2d at 1087.
165. Id. at 1084.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1085. This reasoning proved circular. See infra note 294.
169. Although Ulane presented the claims of a postoperative transsexual, the court's rationale
appears to apply with equal force to deny Title VII protection to preoperative transsexuals,
homosexuals, and transvestites. In fact, the court's rationale parallels the reasons offered by
the other courts that denied Title VII protection to preoperative transsexuals. See supra notes
116-28 and accompanying text.
170. 742 F.2d at 1085 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
171. 742 F.2d at 1085. The court of appeals wrote that "[tihe phrase in Title VII prohibiting
discrimination based on sex, in its plain meaning, implies that it is unlawful to discriminate
against women because they are women and against men because they are men." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court of appeals stated that "[h]ad Congress intended more, surely the legislative
history would have at least mentioned its intended broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites,
or transsexuals, and would no doubt have sparked an interesting debate." Id.
174. Id. at 1085. For a discussion of these legislative bills, see supra notes 124-26 and
accompanying text.
175. 742 F.2d at 1085-86. The court of appeals also noted that Congress had continued to
reject these legislative bills even after courts had denied Title VII protection to transsexuals.
Id. at 1086.
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Based on these reasons, the court of appeals held that Congress did not
intend Title VII to protect transsexuals. 7 Therefore, the court stated that
it could not act in a legislative role by expanding the statute's scope to
protect individuals such as Ulane.'" Furthermore, the court held that Con-
gress was the proper forum for the determination of whether Title VII should
protect transsexuals because it was the only appropriate body to consider all
the ramifications of such an extension.' Thus, the court held that Ulane
and other transsexuals should not be protected by Title VII until Congress
specifically provided for such coverage. 79
The court of appeals also rejected the amended finding of the district
court that Eastern discriminated against Ulane because she was a female. 8 0
In fact, the court did not find it necessary to decide whether Ulane actually
was a female.' Rather, the court held that the district court failed to make
sufficient factual findings to reach such a conclusion.8 2 In addition, the
court found that "[it is clear from the evidence that if Eastern did discrim-
inate against Ulane, it was not because she is a female, but because Ulane
is a transsexual" who underwent sex reassignment surgery.18 3
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Generally, transsexuals suffer from employment discrimination for two
reasons. First, employers discriminate against them because of their gender
identity disorders. In effect, employers terminate transsexuals because the
employers believe that the transsexuals' gender identity disorders render them
unstable or incapable of performing their jobs.8 4 The three reasons asserted
by the courts that denied Title VII protection to preoperative transsexuals
addressed this situation.8 5 Second, this Note contends that employers dis-
criminate against postoperative transsexuals because of their new sex. In this
176. Id. at 1086.
177. Id. (citing Gunnison v. Commissioner, 461 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1972)).
178. 742 F.2d at 1086.
179. Id. Therefore, the court did not reach the issues of whether Ulane was discriminated
against because of her transsexuality or whether nontranssexuality was a bona fide occupational
qualification for the position of commercial airlines piilot. Id. at 1087.
180. Id. at 1087.
181. Id. The court stated:
After the surgery, hormones, appearance changes, and a new Illinois birth certificate
and FAA pilot's certificate, it may be that society, as the trial judge found, considers
Ulane to be female. But even if one believes that a woman can be so easily created
from what remains of a man, that does not decide this case.
Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court of appeals carefully avoided ruling whether sex reassignment surgery
caused Ulane to change from a male to a female. See id.
184. The range of arguments was reflected in Eastern's appellate briefs, where the company
argued that Ulane's transsexualism would reflect poorly on business, cause distress among
coworkers, and render Ulane unsafe and unreliable as an employee. See Brief for Appellant,
supra note 152, at 35-47.
185. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
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situation, the employer discriminates against the postoperative transsexual
because the employer treats all members of the transsexual's new sex less
favorably or because the transsexual was a member of one sex when hired
but now is a member of the opposite sex. The court of appeals in Ulane
considered the first manner of discrimination, but not the second.
The court of appeals in Ulane denied Title VII protection to a postoperative
transsexual by adopting the reasoning of the courts that have refused such
protection to preoperative transsexuals based on their gender identity dis-
orders. 186 In essence, the court held that both preoperative and postoperative
transsexuals faced discrimination based on their transsexualism, that is, on
their gender identity disorder.8 7 Therefore, the court assumed that it did not
have to determine whether postoperative transsexuals such as Ulane actually
changed their sex after sex reassignment surgery. 88 Ulane's postoperative
sex, whether it was female or male, was irrelevant to the court's analysis of
whether the word sex in Title VII encompassed transsexuals.' 8 9 As a result,
the Ulane court adopted the reasoning of the courts that considered the
claims of preoperative transsexuals.' 90
The court merely determined that (1) the plain meaning of the word sex
in Title VII did not encompass discrimination against transsexuals; 9' (2) the
legislative history of Title VII did not indicate a congressional intent to
protect transsexuals; 92 and (3) the congressional rejection of attempts to
amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
indicated that Congress intended the word sex in Title VII to have a
traditional meaning.' 93 In addition, the court of appeals found that the
district court did not make sufficient findings to hold that Eastern discrim-
inated against Ulane because she was a female. 94
The court's rationale, however, is seriously flawed in three respects. First,
the court failed to determine whether transsexuals assume a new sexual status
186. See supra note 169.
187. For example, the court of appeals referred to an individual like Ulane as:
a person who has a sexual identity disorder, i.e., a person born with a male body
who believes himself to be a female, or a person born with a female body who
believes herself to be a male; a prohibition against discrimination based on an
individual's sex is not synonymous with a prohibition against discrimination based
on an individual's sexual identity disorder or discontent with the sex into which they
were born.
742 F.2d at 1085. Such a statement does not take into account the fact that sex reassignment
surgery conforms the transsexual's anatomy with his or her gender identity. See supra note 40
and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
189. The court did discuss the debate over whether sex is unalterably determined at birth by
the individual's chromosome composition. 742 F.2d at 1083 n.6. The court, however, did not
resolve the issue or relate the question of the postoperative transsexual's sex to its analysis.
190. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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after sex reassignment surgery. The medical testimony presented at trial
suggested that transsexuals do assume a new sexual status after sex reassign-
ment surgery. 95 Consequently, employers may discriminate against postop-
erative transsexuals at least in part based on their new sex, an action that
Title VII should prohibit. 96 Second, the court ignored the weaknesses in-
herent in each of the three reasons asserted by the courts that denied Title
VII coverage to a plaintiff who claimed discrimination based on his or her
status as a transsexual. Third, the court should have recognized that Title
VII prohibits discrimination against postoperative transsexuals based on their
new sex, rather than on their sex change.
A. Sexual Status After Sex Reassignment Surgery
The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether Ulane's sexual
status after sex reassignment surgery was female or male. 197 Thus, the court
failed to recognize certain significant differences between preoperative and
postoperative transsexuals. Ulane's physical and psychological condition
strongly suggested that she was a female. 98 In fact, the district court stated
that Ulane appeared and acted as a female. 99 The district court remarked
that "[i]t would take an extremely practiced eye . . . to detect any difference
between the plaintiff and the biological woman. ' 20 0 The only factors of sex
that could not be changed in Ulane or any other individual are chromosome
composition and sex assigned at birth.20' Many commentators have criticized
the determination of sex based only on one's chromosomes. 20 2 Indeed, it is
incorrect to classify postoperative transsexuals by their preoperative sex
because they now appear, act, and are regarded by society as members of
their postoperative sex. It is equally inappropriate to classify an individual's
sexual status by the sex that he or she was assigned at birth. Not only are
such designations sometimes impossible to make and subject to mistake,0 3
but also many states, including Illinois, permit postoperative transsexuals to
alter the sex designations on their birth certificates. 204 These state laws, as
the district court noted, are strong evidence of a social policy to recognize
the changed sex of the postoperative transsexual. 20 5
There is also compelling precedent for courts to hold that sex reassignment
195. See supra note 157; see also Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 93 Misc. 2d 713,
400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (testimony of Drs. Money, Granato, Rubbell, and
Wollman).
196. See supra notes 103-12 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
198. 581 F. Supp. at 817.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Wise, supra note 43, at 170.
202. See supra notes 30, 38.
203. See supra note 35.
204. See supra note 90.
205. 581 F. Supp. at 824.
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surgery changes the transsexual's sex for purposes of the law. In M. T.206 the
court held that the crucial determinants of sex were the individual's anatomy
and gender identity, not his or her chromosomes. 20 7 Thus, the M. T. court
found that sex reassignment surgery changed the transsexual's sex because
it conformed the individual's postoperative anatomy to his or her gender
identity.20 8 As a result, the M. T. court upheld the validity of a marriage
between a male-to-female transsexual and a male. 209 Likewise, although there
may be some dispute in the medical community, 210 sex reassignment surgery
should be deemed to change the transsexual's sex for Title VII purposes.
An employment decision to terminate a transsexual after he or she has
undergone sex reassignment surgery conceivably can occur solely because the
employee ceased being a member of one sex and became a member of the
opposite sex. 2 ' In fact, when Eastern terminated Ulane, it told her:
To the extent the operation and the counseling you have undergone
have been successful in changing your essential nature from male to
female, it has changed you from the person Eastern has hired into
a different person. Eastern would not have hired you had it known
you contemplated or might in the future contemplate such an ac-
tion. 2 12
The district court found this statement to be a "virtual admission" of
discrimination based on sex.2"3 By terminating Ulane, Eastern arguably set
forth a policy that employees such as Ulane must remain male. Eastern
wanted Kenneth Ulane, a male. Eastern did not want Karen Ulane, a
female. 21 4 Thus, the district court was correct in finding that Eastern's
requirement was based on Ulane's sex. 215 The court of appeals, by not
directly addressing this issue, erroneously precluded Ulane from using a
viable argument to extend Title VII protection to postoperative transsexuals.
There is an additional reason to extend Title VII protection to postoperative
transsexuals. Transsexuals usually derive a great deal of satisfaction from
sex reassignment surgery because it diminishes the conflict between their
anatomy and their gender identity.2 6 As a result, postoperative transsexuals
can function better in society. 217 Their gender identity disorders, nevertheless,
206. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
207. 140 N.J. Super. at 89, 355 A.2d at 208-09.
208. Id. at 89-90, 355 A.2d at 210-11.
209. Id. at 90, 355 A.2d at 211.
210. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
211. See Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at 1106.
212. 581 F. Supp. at 832.
213. Id. The district court commented that such a statement "should probably be included
as part of the hand-out material for any seminar on discrimination cases." Id.
214. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 150, at 35.
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 25, 65 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 65.
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will continue to exist. 21 1 In other words, postoperative transsexuals will always
be cognizant of the fact that they were not born and raised as members of
their postoperative sex. 219 Their gender identity disorders, however, are usu-
ally not manifested by the anxieties and depressions that afflicted the trans-
sexuals before surgery, which often impaired their functioning 220 and caused
them to consider suicide and self-mutilation. 2 1
Therefore, employer discrimination against postoperative transsexuals might
well be unrelated to their gender identity disorders, which, unlike before
surgery, are not manifested in an unconstructive fashion. In fact, because
Ulane was not terminated before surgery, when his gender identity disorder
was most severe, it reasonably can be inferred that discrimination after
surgery occurred at least in part because she changed her sex. Such discrim-
ination is based on sex and thus violates Title VII.222
The court of appeals should have distinguished preoperative transsexuals
from postoperative transsexuals. Discrimination against postoperative trans-
sexuals often might occur at least partly because of their postoperative sexual
status. 223 On the other hand, preoperative transsexuals usually suffer discrim-
ination based soley on their gender identity disorders. 224 Some may attempt
to argue that Title VII should protect preoperative transsexuals who are
discriminated against because they are about to undergo surgery to change
their sex. 225 Courts, however, should consider the additional reasons to afford
Title VII protection to postoperative transsexuals. 226
B. The Ulane Rationale
Title VII prohibits discrimination based at least in part on an individual's
sex. 227 Eastern admitted that one of its bases for terminating Ulane was that
she ceased being a male and became a female.22 This Note suggests that
Eastern's statement can be interpreted to mean that it discriminated against
218. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
219. See id.
220. See Ulane, 581 F. Supp. at 831. The district court in Ulane referred to "the substantial
body of medical literature which supports the proposition that sex reassignment surgery has on
the whole been successful in alleviating the anxieties and the depressions that transsexuals
without the surgery frequently have." 581 F. Supp. at 831.
221. See supra note 46.
222. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
224. See cases cited supra note 114.
225. Judge Goodwin appeared to make such an argument in his dissent in Holloway. See
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text. Judge Goodwin seemed to assume that the Holloway
majority would hold that a postoperative transsexual discriminated against because he or she
changed sex would be protected by Title VII. See id. The majority, however, probably meant
to state that Title VII would protect a postoperative female, for example, where the employer
treated all females less favorably, not where the employer objected to the actual change of sex.
See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. Thus, Judge Goodwin's argument and his
criticism of the majority are misplaced.
226. See supra notes 206-22 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
228. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
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Ulane because it required employees to remain members of the sex into
which they were born. It is further asserted that Title VII protects individuals
who are discriminated against because they ceased being members of one
sex and became members of the opposite sex. Such action literally appears
to be based on sex. Therefore, the court of appeals should have found that
Ulane was protected by Title VII and was discriminated against based on
her sex. The court then should have proceeded to determine whether non-
transsexuality was a bona fide occupational qualification for employment as
a commercial airline pilot.229
The court, however, did not reach such a result. Instead, the court focused
on the three reasons offered by other courts to deny Title VII protection to
preoperative transsexuals who were discriminated against based on their
gender identity disorders. 20 This Note suggests that courts should not rely
on those reasons in cases involving postoperative transsexuals. Nevertheless,
courts may agree with Ulane that there is no reason to distinguish between
preoperative and postoperative transsexuals because discrimination against
both groups is based solely on their status as transsexuals, that is, as
individuals with gender identity disorders. This Note, therefore, will analyze
those three reasons and suggest their inherent weaknesses when applied to
individuals who are discriminated against based on their gender identity
disorders .231
1. Plain Meaning of the Word Sex
The court of appeals in Ulane held that the plain meaning of the word
sex in Title VII prohibited discrimination against women as women and
against men as men. 23 2 The court's basis for this plain meaning definition
229. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
231. This Note will be limited to the court of appeals' three reasons for denying Title VII
protection to transsexuals and to the court's finding that Ulane was not discriminated against
as a female. However, transsexuals can assert a wide range of arguments when seeking protection
from employment discrimination. See generally Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at 1098-1128
(transsexuals can make the following arguments: transsexualism is immutable; the transsexual's
sex "plus" the neutral factor of sex reassignment surgery falls within Title VII protection under
the sex-plus cases; sex reassignment surgery is a fundamental right and deserves the same
protection as the right to marry or bear children; transsexuals are a suspect class; and transsexuals
are handicapped individuals under state and federal laws and are subject to discrimination
based on their handicaps).
Additionally, transsexuals may be able to persuade a court that sex reassignment surgery
causes one's sex no longer to be immutable. But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
687 (1973) (sex is immutable); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (sex is
immutable). Sex could be analogized to religion, which a person can easily change. Thus,
discriminating against an individual because he or she changed sex is like discriminating against
an individual for converting from one religion to another. Such discrimination should be covered
by Title VII when an employer takes action because of the employee's new religion. An employer
who discriminates not because of the employee's new religion but because the employer feels
anyone who would convert to a new religion is unstable presents the same situation as an
employer who discriminates against a transsexual because of the transsexual's sex change.
Arguably, the employer's conduct in both situations should violate Title VII.
232. 742 l.2d at 1085.
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was its own perception of the popular meaning of the word sex. 233 The court
of appeals specifically rejected the district court's reliance on medical testi-
mony and medical evidence to determine the plain meaning of the word
sex. 234 There are compelling reasons, however, for courts considering trans-
sexuals' claims to consider medical testimony and medical evidence when
determining the meaning of the word sex.
The district court in Ulane was the first court to compile a factual record
before determining whether Title VII protected transsexuals. The other courts,
after determining that Title VII did not protect transsexuals, granted the
defendants' motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. 23" Thus,
the district court in Ulane benefited from an abundance of medical evidence
and the ability to assess the credibility of medical witnesses.2 36 The district
court found that the word sex, as defined by the medical witnesses, includes
gender identity.237 Because Title VII is a remedial statute that must be liberally
interpreted,2 8 the district court found that it could broadly interpret the
medical definition of sex to protect transsexuals who were discriminated
against because of their gender identity disorders.23 9 The court of appeals
rejected such an analysis in favor of its own narrow view of the meaning of
the word sex. 2"4
The district court's analysis seems to be the more reasonable approach to
determine the plain meaning of the word sex. An individual's gender identity,
that is, the individual's psychological feelings of being a male or a female, 24'
is a key element of his or her sex. 24 2 Indeed, many legal commentators argue
that gender identity is the most important element to be considered when
determining one's sex. 243 Gender identity, however, is not synonymous with
sex,2" as some have argued, 24 because there are at least seven other factors
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1086. The court of appeals held that "[wle do not believe that the interpretation
of the word 'sex' as used in the statute is a mere matter of expert medical testimony or the
credibility of witnesses produced in court." Id.
235. See cases cited supra note 114.
236. The district court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility was particularly instructive.
The district court stated that "[mly reaction to each and every plaintiff's medical witness was
positive. My reaction to each and every defense medical witness was negative." 581 F. Supp.
at 832. The district court, referring to one medical witness for the defense, stated, "I can tell
you quite candidly that I attach no weight whatever to his testimony and, other things being
equal, would be inclined to believe that the opposite of anything he testified to would be more
probably true than not true." Id. at 824.
237. Id. at 825.
238. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
239. 581 F. Supp. at 824-25.
240. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
243. See id.
244. See supra note 23.
245. Cf. Brief for Appellee, supra note 150, at 35 ("Ulane . ..changed her gender from
male to female . . . .Nothing changed but her gender." It was Ulane's sex, not her gender
that changed. Her gender remained feminine after surgery.)
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that constitute an individual's sex.246 Nevertheless, transsexuals can argue
that because gender identity is a component of sex, any discrimination based
on gender identity necessarily is based on sex. Indeed, it appears that the
district court in Ulane based its holding on such an argument. Although
Title VII prohibits discrimination based partly on sex, no court other than
the district court in Ulane has accepted the argument that Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on a part of sex, that is, on gender identity. 247 The
courts that rejected this argument, unlike the district court in Ulane, did not
benefit from a factual record and medical testimony to aid in defining the
word sex and to aid in revealing the crucial role an individual's gender
identity plays in determining his or her sex. 24
Courts often have relied on medical testimony and medical evidence for
guidance when determining the definition of words or terms with inherently
medical meanings. For example, medical testimony and evidence have assisted
courts in determining the definition of such words as "life,'' 249 "death,'' 250
and "mentally ill.' ' 251 In these instances, courts did not apply their own
perceptions of the words' plain meanings. Similarly, the court of appeals
should have relied on medical authorities for guidance when defining such
an inherently medical term as sex.
2. Legislative History
The court of appeals assumed that because Title VII's legislative history
was silent regarding the protection of transsexuals, Congress did not intend
to protect such individuals. 2 2 Such an assumption, however, ignores the fact
that Title VII is a remedial statute that must be liberally construed. 23
Granted, courts cannot extend a remedial statute to protect individuals who
clearly do not fall within the statute's ambit.2 5 4 Nevertheless, Congress did
246. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
247. See cases cited supra note 114.
248. The district court, in finding that the word sex applies to transsexuals, stated: "That
there is room for argument on the question does not release me from making a decision one
way or the other, and I have made the decision which seems to me to be the one most consistent
with the factual record that was developed in this case." 581 F. Supp. at 825.
249. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (Supreme Court essentially recognizing the
medical definition of the viability of the fetus as the onset of life for constitutional purposes).
250. The traditional definition of death was the cessation of the heartbeat. Medical evidence
and testimony, however, have convinced courts and legislators to accept "brain death" as the
test for death. See Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 251-54, 366 N.E.2d 744, 747-
48, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); In re Welfare of Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 407, 412-16,
617 P.2d 731, 734-36 (1980); see also Recent Case, The Acceptance of Brain Death As a Legal
Definition of Death in Illinois: In Re Haymer, 33 DE PAUL L. REV. 207 (1983) (reviews the
adoption of brain death as the standard for determining cessation of life).
251. See generally Hermann, Morrison, Sor, Norman & Neff, People of the State of Illinois
vs. John Gacy: The Functioning of the Insanity Defense at the Limits of the Criminal Law,
86 W. VA. L. REV. 1169 (1984) (review of the case, which includes discussion of the use of
medical testimony to define the term mentally ill).
252. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
254. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086.
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not discuss whether transsexuals specifically would be protected by Title
VII. 2" The district court in Ulane, however, reasonably found that the word
sex in Title VII protected transsexuals. 2 6 Thus, the court of appeals' erro-
neous holding that the plain meaning of sex does not encompass transsexuals,
led to its erroneous conclusion that Title VII could not be construed to
protect transsexuals. Instead, the court of appeals should have found not
only that the word sex encompassed transsexuals, but also that congressional
silence regarding transsexuals meant that Congress did not specifically intend
to exclude such individuals from Title VII protection. Such a result would
have been consistent with the liberal interpretation that remedial statutes
should be given.
Additionally, Congress cannot be expected to consider all possible inter-
pretations of statutory language. Thus, its failure specifically to outlaw
discrimination against transsexuals is inconclusive.21 7 Courts have not hesi-
tated to extend the Title VII prohibition of sex-based discrimination to
situations not discussed in the legislative debates. 2 s Similarly, by extending
Title VII protection to transsexuals, courts would not be usurping a legislative
function, as the court of appeals in Ulane argued. 2 9 Rather, courts would
be acting within their authority by interpreting a remedial statute in a liberal
fashion.
3. Sexual Orientation Bills
The court of appeals concluded that congressional rejection of bills to
amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation
indicated that Congress intended a traditional meaning of the word sex.
260
Once again, the court interpreted Title VII in a narrow manner. Instead,
the court should have acknowledged the statute's remedial purpose and thus
interpreted the statute and any failed attempts to amend it in a liberal
fashion.
These sexual orientation bills were intended to and clearly would have
only served to protect homosexuals, who are individuals subject to discrim-
ination based on their sexual orientations. 26' Courts have asserted that trans-
sexuals, in contrast, are individuals subject to discrimination based on their
gender identity disorders, rather than their sexual orientations. 262 Therefore,
255. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text; see also Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical
Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (Title VII "speaks of discrimination on the
basis of 'sex.' No mention is made of change of sex or sexual preference.")
256. 581 F. Supp. at 825.
257. It is not surprising that Congress did not specifically protect transsexuals in Title VII
because such individuals are numerically small, see supra note 42, socially unpopular, and'
politically powerless. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; infra notes 284-87 and accom-
panying text.
258. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
259. 742 F.2d at 1086.
260. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
262. See cases cited supra note 114.
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the court of appeals should have declined to infer any conclusions from the
rejection of these bills because they would not have afforded protection to
transsexuals.
Furthermore, medical evidence shows that an individual's gender identity
is a crucial component of his or her sex.2 63 This fact led the district court
in Ulane to conclude that discrimination based on an individual's gender
identity necessarily is based on sex.26 Thus, the district court ruled that Title
VII was violated. 265 An individual's sexual orientation, however, is not an
element of his or her sex. Sexual orientation, as used in the bills, refers to
an individual's preference in sex or affectional partners. 266 Thus, homosexuals
could not assert discrimination based on any component of sex. Moreover,
they would not be covered by the Ulane district court's reasoning. Instead,
homosexuals have argued that discrimination against them should be pro-
hibited because it has a discriminatory impact on males267 or because it
constitutes sexual stereotyping. 261 In summary, courts consider transsexuals
to be discriminated against based on a sex component known as their gender
identity while homosexuals are discriminated against not based on a sex
component, but rather, based on their choice of sex or affectional partners.
Thus, any legislation that specifically relates to homosexuals will be inappl-
icable to transsexuals. Hence, the court of appeals should have disregarded
the congressional rejection of the sexual orientation bills.
C. Ulane as a Female
The court of appeals rejected the amended finding of the district court
that Eastern discriminated against Ulane because she was a female. 269 The
court of appeals did not specifically state that a postoperative transsexual
could claim discrimination based on his or her new sex. Instead, the court
stated that "the argument might be made that Title VII applied" when an
employer discriminated against a postoperative female because in general the
employer treated females less favorably than males.2 70 Indeed, in such a
situation Title VII protection is inescapable.
263. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
264. 581 F. Supp. at 825.
265. Id.
266. See supra notes 124-25.
267. See Siniscalco, Homosexual Discrimination in Employment, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
495 (1976). The author suggests that homosexuals argue, based on Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), that discrimination has a disparate impact on males because males constitute
a much greater proportion of homosexuals than females. Siniscalco, supra, at 508-10. This
argument was rejected in DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330-31 (9th Cir.
1979). Undoubtedly, courts would follow DeSantis to reject such a disparate impact argument
by individuals suffering from transsexualism, which also afflicts males much more frequently
than females. See supra note 42.
268. See Comment, Challenging Sexual Preference Discrimination in Private Employment,
41 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 507-09 (1980) (arguing that discrimination because of sexual orientation
violates a congressional intent to ban discrimination based on irrelevant stereotypes).
269. 742 F.2d at 1087.
270. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit in Halloway,27' stated, in dicta, that Title VII protected
a postoperative transsexual discriminated against because of his or her new
sex.2 72 A contrary finding would permit an employer to tell a postoperative
transsexual that he or she was being discriminated against because the
employer did not want employees who were members of the transsexual's
new sex. 2" Clearly, Title VII was intended to proscribe such employer
conduct. Thus, Title VII should cover a situation when an employer, without
knowledge that an employee is a postoperative transsexual, discriminates
against that employee based on his or her postoperative sex.
A conclusion that postoperative transsexuals could not claim discrimination
based on their postoperative sex would mean that they could only claim
discrimination based on their sex before surgery or could not claim sex-
based discrimination at all. It is highly unlikely that an employer would
discriminate against a postoperative transsexual based on his or her preop-
erative sex. If a postoperative transsexual dresses and acts like a female,
considers herself a female, physically appears to be a female, and is consid-
ered by others to be a female, it is inconceivable that an employer would
discriminate against her based on her preoperative male sex. To conclude
otherwise is to assume that an employer would ignore the transsexual's new
appearance. Moreover, such a conclusion implies that an individual's sex is
unalterably determined at birth by chromosome composition.2 74 This conclu-
sion is misguided and would effectively deny Title VII protection to post-
operative transsexuals.
Likewise, it is impractical to conclude that an employer could never
discriminate against a postoperative transsexual because that individual is a
male or a female. This conclusion implies that such individuals do not have
a male or female sex for Title VII purposes. Following from this conclusion,
three sexes would have to be recognized under the law: male, female, and
postoperative transsexual. Such a conclusion would lead to drastic conse-
quences in many areas of the law. 27 Furthermore, such a conclusion is
unsupported by medical science, which does not recognize the status of
postoperative transsexual as a separate sex. 276
The court of appeals in Ulane held that the district court did not make
the necessary factual findings to support its holding that Eastern discrimi-
nated against Ulane because she was a female. 277 In fact, the court of appeals
ruled that the evidence clearly proved that Eastern terminated Ulane because
271. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
272. 566 F.2d at 664.
273. See Brief for Appellee, supra note 150, at 38.
274. For a criticism of the argument that chromosomes alone should determine an individual's
sex, see supra notes 30, 38. Furthermore, such a position was rejected by the court in M.T.,
140 N.J. Super. at 88, 355 A.2d at 208. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
275. See Comment, The Law and Transsexualism, supra note 43, at 294 (dispensing with the
male/female sex classification system is impractical and unnecessary).
276. Medical authorities classify postoperative transsexuals by either their preoperative or
postoperative sex, not by a "transsexual" sex classification. See supra note 26.
277. 742 F.2d at 1087.
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she was a transsexual, not because she was a female. 278 There was substantial
evidence presented, however, that Eastern treated Ulane differently than
similarly situated male pilots.279 Therefore, the court of appeals should have
at least remanded the case to the district court to make specific findings on
whether Eastern discriminated against Ulane as a female.
IMPACT
The court of appeals in Ulane extended the rationale for excluding pre-
operative transsexuals from Title VII protection to postoperative transsex-
uals. 2s° The court found that Congress did not intend to prohibit employment
discrimination based on an individual's status as a transsexual, that is, as
an individual suffering from a gender identity disorder. 2 ' Therefore, based
on Ulane, courts would lack jurisdiction to hear such claims. As a result,
courts would be compelled to grant defendants' motions to dismiss when
transsexuals claim discrimination based on their gender identity disorders.28 2
Thus, a court following the holding in Ulane would not entertain medical
testimony and medical evidence to determine whether the word sex could
encompass transsexuals. Because such testimony may be crucial to a finding
of Title VII coverage, transsexuals would be precluded from offering im-
portant evidence to a court that adopts the court of appeals' view in Ulane.
Thus, the procedural impact of Ulane is twofold. First, transsexuals are
precluded from seeking judicial relief for employment discrimination based
on their gender identity disorders. Unless a court chooses to follow the
district court's rationale in Ulane, defendants' motions to dismiss will rou-
tinely be granted. Second, the court of appeals in Ulane held that Title VII
would only protect transsexuals if Congress manifested a specific intent to
afford such protection. Transsexuals, therefore, are forced to seek a legis-
lative amendment to Title VII that would specifically prohibit discrimination
against them.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that Congress will enact such an amend-
ment. Transsexuals are few in number2 3 and do not have the political power
or organization needed to effect congressional action. 214 In addition, Congress
may perceive that the hearings and debates needed to amend Title VII to
protect transsexuals would not be warranted in light of the exceedingly small
number of individuals whom the amendment would affect. 25 Futhermore,
278. Id.
279. See 581 F. Supp. at 833-37.
280. See supra note 169.
281. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
282. See cases cited supra note 114.
283. See supra note 42.
284. See Wein & Remmers, supra note 42, at 1106 n.191 ("Congressional unfamiliarity with
transsexualism and the group's neglible political power has been recently demonstrated by
legislative attempts to amend Title VII to include 'sexual preference or orientation,' but not
transsexualism.").
285. See supra note 42. Any amendment to Title VII to protect transsexuals would not cover
homosexuals for the same reasons that the amendments proposed to protect homosexuals would
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transsexuals are not the subject of widespread public support.28 6 To the
contrary, they are misunderstood and scorned by society.28 7 Thus, not only
would Congress encounter little popular support to extend Title VII protec-
tion to transsexuals, but also any such amendment probably would be
subjected to widespread denunciation and, thus, would not be politically
expedient for members of Congress to support. As a result, congressional
action is highly improbable. 28
Substantively, the court of appeals in Ulane added little new analysis to
the issue of whether Title VII prohibits discrimination against individuals
because of their gender identity disorders. The court, however, made a
somewhat encouraging statement that postoperative transsexuals might be
able to argue that Title VII protects them from discrimination where other
members of their new sex also suffer from discrimination. 289 Of course, to
make such a claim the postoperative transsexual first would have to convince
the court that sex reassignment surgery actually changed his or her sex for
Title VII purposes. 290 The court of appeals in Ulane did not decide this
issue. 29' Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a court to hold a trial on
the merits to determine whether the postoperative transsexual changed sexes.
Moreover, a court would then have to determine whether a postoperative
transsexual was discriminated against because members of his or her new
sex were treated less favorably. Thus, in this situation, postoperative trans-
sexuals' Title VII claims should not be dismissed. Practically, postoperative
transsexuals should always argue that their employers discriminated against
them based on their new sex; otherwise, a claim of discrimination solely
because of a gender identity disorder would be dismissed. 292 Similarly, pre-
operative transsexuals after Ulane can only claim discrimination based on
their current sex, which would be the sex into which they were born.
In addition to its impact on future courts considering Title VII claims of
transsexuals, the Ulane decision will affect Title VII claims of homosexuals
not have covered transsexuals. See supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text. Thus, transsexuals
could not count on the support of homosexuals.
286. See Brent, Some Legal Problems of the Postoperative Transsexual, 12 J. FAM. L. 405,
420-21 (1972-73) ("[q]uestions of sexual deviation and sexual abnormalities probably provoke
more emotional responses in society generally than almost any other subject.").
287. Id.
288. Moreover, courts have an obligation to interpret remedial laws in a fashion so that they
overcome prejudices. In Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), the
court stated that Title VII in particular was intended to overcome customer prejudices. Id. at
389. Therefore, the court found that the defendant airline violated Title VII by prohibiting
men from becoming flight attendants on the theory that customers prefer women flight
attendants. Id. Likewise, courts should not be influenced by public sentiment against transsex-
uals.
289. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
290. For an analysis of whether sex reassignment surgery actually changes the transsexual's
sex, see supra notes 198-210 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 183.
292. See supra notes 105-12 and accompanying text.
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and transvestites. The court stated, in dicta, that Title VII does not protect
homosexuals and transvestites. 293 Thus, although Title VII claims by hom-
osexuals and transvestites have not yet been addressed by a court in the
Seventh Circuit, such arguments probably would be rejected. 294 As a result,
the Ulane decision may affect a much greater number of individuals than
just transsexuals.
The Ulane decision also may affect the rights of transsexuals in areas of
the law other than Title VII. For example, courts may be persuaded to
follow the Ulane court's narrow approach to interpreting laws that affect
transsexuals rather than adopt the liberal approach of the court in M. T.2 95
Thus, the Ulane court's narrow plain meaning approach to defining the
word sex may prompt future courts to discard M. T. and conclude that the
traditional notion that sex is based on one's chromosomes and sex designation
at birth should be utilized to preclude transsexual marriages. 96
Likewise, courts may rely upon the Ulane court's finding that Title VII
should not protect transsexuals absent specific legislative intent. For example,
numerous states lack statutes that specfically allow postoperative transsexuals
to change the sex designations on their birth certificates.2 97 Therefore, based
on Ulane, courts in those states could conclude that such changes cannot be
made absent clear legislative intent. 29s Thus, Ulane could spark a new trend
among courts to narrowly interpret laws that effect transsexuals.2 99
293. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
294. The Ulane court stated that it was denying Title VII protection to transsexuals for the
same reasons that it would deny Title VII protection to homosexuals and transvestites. See
supra note 168 and accompanying text. To the contrary, courts have denied Title VII protection
to homosexuals based on the reasons asserted by courts that denied Title VII protection to
transsexuals. See DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
Holloway v. Arthur Andersen and Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977)).
295. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
296. Although the court of appeals in Ulane did not specifically determine that sex is based
solely on one's chromosomes, the court's holding may encourage other courts to determine sex
based on their perceptions of its plain meaning. Thus, courts may rely on cases prior to M.T.
that ruled that the plain meaning of sex is to be determined by one's chromosomes and sex at
birth. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. In any event, the court of appeals'
decision in Ulane signals a departure from M.T.'s liberal holding.
297. For a list of states that specifically allow postoperative transsexuals to change the sex
designations on their birth certificates, see supra note 90.
298. But see supra note 90 (the State of New York has allowed such changes absent specific
legislative intent).
299. Nevertheless, it appears that the holding by the court of appeals in Ulane will have no
effect on postoperative transsexuals seeking name changes, because such changes are routinely
granted. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Likewise, the Ulane decision should not
effect the payment of medicaid for sex reassignment surgery, because such payment is condi-
tioned on the medical necessity of such surgery, which was not considered by the court of
appeals in Ulane. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text. In addition, the Ulane holding
should not affect the criminal liability of preoperative transsexuals who violate cross-dressing
statutes because the Ulane case did not deal with the propriety of cross-dressing by preoperative
transsexuals. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In Ulane, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the
argument that Title VII protects postoperative transsexuals. The court's
reasoning applies with equal weight to deny Title VII protection to preop-
erative transsexuals, homosexuals, and transvestites. The court's analysis,
however, ignores the remedial purposes of Title VII and rejects medical
testimony and medical evidence to determine the meaning of transsexualism
and the word sex. Therefore, transsexuals are precluded from seeking judicial
relief from employment discrimination.20 In addition, transsexuals are ex-
tremely unlikely to receive such relief from Congress. As a result, Ulane
permits employers to discriminate against transsexuals without fear of vio-
lating federal statutory law.
David M. Neff
300. Cf. Comment, Transsexualism, supra note 27, at 1008-09 ("Future judicial response [to
transsexualism] hopefully will be liberal and understanding. The guidepost of legal decision-
making in this area should always be what is in the best interests of the transsexual, for those
interests and the interests of society are not in conflict."); Wein & Remmers, supra note 42,
at 1106 ("Because of the stigma attached to this small, powerless minority, the judiciary should
be more sympathetic to the transsexual's employment discrimination claim.")
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